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STATE OF UTAH 
JENNY JOHANSON NORLING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, PETITION FOR 
) REHEARING 
-v-
) Case No. 13769 
JOSEPH ANDERSON, JUNE J. ANDERSON 
and ESTHER J. FINCH, ) 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
In the Matter of the Estate ) 
and Guardianship of 
JENNY JOHANSON NORLING, Case No. 13764 
An Elderly Person. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 
Petitioner petitions for rehearing in the above cases and as 
cause for same alleges: 
This court did not render a decision on appellants' points 
on appeal. Instead, the court humorously quips a decision on just 
one item of appellants' contentions. Humorous, of course, to the 
author of the opinion and the justices who concurred in it. But 
not to appellants. These law suits were very serious to appellants 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Andersons particularly, encompassing as they do most serious 
economic transaction of their lives. Appellants submit that the 
court and each justice comprising the court have an obligation to 
render a decision by the court on each point presented on appeal. 
Following we submit is where the court failed in this obligation. 
NORLING v. ANDERSON ET AL, CASE NO. 13769 
1. THE APPELLANTS1 CONTENTION THAT TITLE PASSED ON AUGUST 2, 1973 
(Brief 18-22) 
Appellants contended that the deed to the real property involved 
was delivered by Norling to the Andersons on August 2, 1973 and on 
that day (August 2, 1973) title to the property passed from Norling 
to the Andersons. This contention was based on the following items: 
(a) Finding 
In Finding 2, the lower court found that: 
. . . after execution of the deed, the deed was 
delivered to defendant June J. Anderson who initialed 
the deed to indicate delivery of the same, the 
attorney stating that a deed must be delivered in order 
to be valid. (Brief 8) 
(b) Uncontradicted Evidence 
The uncontradicted evidence of attorney Merrill K. Davis 
was that the deed was prepared by him at the request of Norling, 
that Norling told Davis that she wanted the property to go to the 
Andersons since they had been staying with her and taking care of 
her; that he explained to her the difference between a will and a 
deed; that with a deed there was no need of a will and the property 
would not have to be probated. (Brief 7-10) 
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The uncontradicted evidence and the testimony of Mrs. 
Norling was that at the time she executed the deed and delivered 
it to June Anderson she intended the Andersons to have the property, 
that she was not mad at the Andersons at that time, and that it 
was not until after the execution of said deed and after she went 
to live with other brothers and sisters that she changed her mind. 
(Brief 14-16) 
Not a single word of testimony or evidence is mentioned in 
respondent's brief or in the court's decision contradicting the 
testimony of Mr. Davis and Mrs. Norling, One would surmise from 
reading the court's decision that there was no such testimony. 
(c) Appellant's Authorities 
Besides Jordan v. Jordan, 21 U 2d 348, 445 P 2d 765 (1968), 
appellants cited and relied on the following authorities which 
specifically hold that when a grantor executes and delivers a deed 
with the intention that the grantee have the property, a subsequent 
change of mind cannot upset the conveyance: Simmons v. Murphy (Ark) 
360 SW 2d 765 (1962), citing 26 C.J.S. Deeds, Sec. 41; Wilcox v. 
Hardisty (Cal App.) 212 P 633; Lossee v. Jones, 120 U 325, 235 P 2d 
132 (1951). 
This is Horn Book law. 
THE COURT'S DECISION ON APPELLANTS CONTENTION 
The courtfs decision deals only with item (a) Finding, namely, 
the physical delivery by Mrs. Norling on August 2, 1973 with the 
instructions of the attorney, that June Anderson initial the deed 
to show delivery, and the return of the deed to possession of Norling. 
The court describes this as "a bit of Houdini routine." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Merrill Davis1 directions that June Anderson initial the 
deed to show delivery was lawyer-like and most responsible 
inasmuch as Mrs. Norling was to take custody of it. 
Neither respondent nor the court cite a single authority 
contrary to the above authorities that when a grantor physically 
delivers a deed to the grantee with the intention that the grantee 
have the property, an unrevealed mental reservation or a subsequent 
change of mind does not affect the passing of title of the deed 
upon delivery. 
In lieu of authority to support its decision, the court 
searches out factual distinctions in the Utah cases cited. Some 
factual distinctions always exist between cases. The court's 
factual distinctions do not bear on the law stated in the decisions. 
In distinguishing Jordan (cited above), the court states 
that in that case the grantor's lips were sealed by death, wheras 
the grantor in the instant case was alive and testified. But the 
court does not point out what Mrs. Norling, the grantor, testified. 
Which was that at the time of the delivery of the deed, August 2, 
1973, she wanted the Andersons to have the property, that she was 
not mad at them at that time, and that she thereafter changed her 
mind. Not a single word of testimony, by Mrs. Norling or otherwise, 
is in the record contradicting this testimony. Nor does the court 
point out Mr. Davis1 testimony that Mrs. Norling told him she wanted 
the Andersons to have the property since they had been staying with 
her and caring for her. Not a single word of contrary evidence or 
testimony is referred to in respondent's brief or in the court's 
decision. 
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In distinguishing Lossee the court said it is "inappropros 
here since it has to do with a delivery to a trustee who was 
interdicted to deliver a deed to the grantees after the death. 
But what has that to do with the principle of law in Lossee that 
appellants rely upon, namely, that a grantor cannot change his 
mind. 
The court follows the footsteps of the lower court and 
appears to rule that as the deed of August 2, 1973 was executed 
concurrently with the codicil of Norling's will (same date) and 
the fact that there were prior deeds and wills of Mrs. Norling, 
that Norling intended the document to be a will rather than a 
deed—the court referred to the deed as "in the nature of an 
instrument ambulatoria voluntis". 
What relevance have past deeds and wills to the execution 
of the deed of August 2, 1973 when we have a competent grantor 
whose lips were not sealed by death and who told the attorney her 
intention was to deed her property to the Andersons and so testified. 
(The prior deeds were torn up and destroyed and renounced by the 
grantees by reason of the changes in the financial situations of 
the children). (Brief 2 0) 
It is common practice for attorneys to draft wills concurrent 
with deeds disposing of the same property. And where, as here, the 
attorney fully explains to the grantor that the deed would obviate 
probate, what relevance can past transactions have to do with the 
question of delivery on August 2, 1973? 
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The term ambulatori voluntis appears to define the nature 
of a document and particularly refers to a "changeable will" rather 
than a principle of law. Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Ed; 
Bouviers Law Dictionary (Rawles Edition). See also Monninger v. 
Koob, 405 111. 417, 91 NE 2d 411, 414 (1950). 
However appellants do find the case of Fonda v. Miller, 411 
111. 74. 103 NE 2d 98 (1952) ruling on the question of whether a deed 
should be considered a will where the grantor retained possession 
of the deed and it was never in fact delivered to the grantee but 
retained in the possession of the grantor's attorney (where grantor 
had retained a life estate). In Fonda the grantor after execution 
also changed his mind. And in his will he repudiated the delivery 
reciting that it had not been his intention that it convey title. 
(In norling's Codicil she recited that she had conveyed title to 
the property involved.) In Fonda the lower court found that the 
delivery 
. . .was intended to operate as a testimentary 
disposition of said real estate, and that said deed 
was never delivered to the grantees named thereon, 
(same situation as in instant case) 
The appellate court in Fonda reversed this decision, holding that 
The deed in the present case was executed with 
all the formalities required by law and made under 
the advice of an attorney who was fully aware of 
the requisites and differences between a deed and 
a will. 
. . . 
Courts do not attach as much importance to the manual 
possession of the deed as they do to the intent of 
the grantor as gathered from the evidence in regard 
to the vesting of title. 
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The execution of the deed with the formality 
required by law, the consultation with an attorney 
at the time of making it, and the subsequent acts 
of the grantor recognizing the title of the grantees 
until he became displeased with Mrs. Miller's refusal 
to execute a deed at his request, all indicate beyond 
any doubt that he intended the deed to take effect 
immediately upon its execution and recording. 
. . • 
The law does not make the grantor's retention of a 
deed duly executed proof of non-delivery, especially 
where he still retains the right of enjoyment. 
The conclusions of the court that the deed of August 2, 1973 
was an "instrument arnbulatoria voluntis" was basically conceived 
by the court. A party has no opportunity to respond when the court 
enters the arena. In the original verified complaint, plaintiff 
alleged that the deed was conditionally delivered not to be recorded 
until plaintiff died. In the unverified amended complaint plaintiff 
alleged that after signature, the deed was deposited in the safety 
deposit box to remain until after the plaintiff's death. 
The "bit of Houdini routine" was not in Mr. Davis1 handling 
of the execution of the deed and having June Anderson acknowledge 
acceptance of delivery before giving back possession to Mrs. Norling, 
but in the court's transposing a deed into a will (absent legal 
precedent). 
2. APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT EVEN IF THE DEED WAS DELIVERED BY 
MRS. NORLING ON CONDITION THAT IT NOT BE RECORDED UNTIL AFTER 
HER DEATH, THAT COULD NOT AFFECT THE PASSING OF TITLE ON AUGUST 
2, 1973. (Brief 22) 
This contention should be answered if the court adheres to 
its decision that there was no intent to deliver on August 2, 1973 
and that such delivery represented no authority to June to record 
the deed on January 11, 1974. From respondent's complaint and 
amended complaint, the theory of respondent and the court appears 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that the deed was delivered on condition that it not be recorded 
until Norling's death. 
In support of appellants1 contentions that a condition against 
recording could not prevent title passing, appellants cite Takacs 
v. Takacs, 317 Mich 72, 26 NW 2d (1947), citing 26 C.J.S. Deeds, 
Sec. 48, pp. 251-52, 28 Am Jur 2d Escrow, Sec. 12, holding that such 
an attempted delivery vests title in the grantee regardless of such 
condition. 
Neither respondents nor the court cite contrary authority. 
THE COURT'S DECISION ON APPELLANT'S CONTENTION 
The court states not a single word on this contention. 
NORLING GUARDIANSHIP, CASE NO. 13764 
This case involves whether Mrs. Norling, by reason of old 
age, weakness of mind, was able unassisted to properly manage and 
take care of her property and would be likely to be deceived or 
imposed upon by artful or designing persons (Utah Code 75-13-20). 
3. APPELLANT CONTENDED THAT THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MENTAL EXAMINATION UNDER 
RULE 35 (SPECIFICALLY PROVIDING FOR MENTAL EXAMINATIONS) UNDER 
THE UNCONTRADICTED SHOWING THAT SUCH EXAMINATION WOULD DETERMINE 
NORLING1 S MENTAL CAPACITY TO CARE FOR HER PROPERTY OR HER 
LIKELIHOOD TO BE IMPOSED UPON BY ARTFUL AND DESIGNING PERSONS. 
(Brief 11) 
Even after the court had denied the motion, and trial was had 
without the benefit of such examination, it again refused to order 
examination despite Dr. Verne Peterson's testimony that it "would 
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be rather a pleasant hour" as opposed to a trial setting. 
Respondent does not respond to this contention except to state 
the notice of hearing was one day defective. No continuance was 
asked and this motion, as all other motions, were heard at the 
earliest possible date to comply with the request of respondent's 
attorney. 
THE COURT'S DECISION 
The court does not rule on this contention, not a word. 
4. APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 
APPOINTING A GUARDIAN OF NORLING'S ESTATE ON THE UNCONTRA-
DICTED EVIDENCE THAT SHE HAD SUFFERED BRAIN DAMAGE, WAS 
INCOMPETENT TO PROPERLY MANAGE HER PROPERTY AND WAS LIKELY 
TO BE IMPOSED UPON BY ARTFUL AND DESIGNING PERSONS (Brief 10-11) 
Relevant to this point, the court will notice that the lower 
court did not weigh the evidence and elect to make findings as it 
could have done under Rule 41 (b). See Petty v. Cindy Manufactur-
ing Corp., 17 U 2d 32, 404 P 2d 30 (1965); Lawrence v. Bamberger Ry 
Co., 3 U 2d 247, 282 P 2d 335 (1952). The lower court did not find 
Mrs. Norling competent. It granted a non-suit, ruling that "there 
was not sufficient evidence presented by the petitioner in support 
of her petition to show the need for an appointment of a guardian 
in the Estate of Jenny Johanson Norling." Thus the duty of this 
court was to determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence 
to show Mrs. Norling1s incompetency under Utah Code 75-13-20. 
Mrs. Norling1s situation appears to fall precisely within 
Utah Code 75-13-20. In her deposition of April 22, 1974 (p. 67) 
she testified: 
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. . .after I got that pneumonia, I've never been 
so sick in my life. . . . That sickness took an 
awful lot out of me. 
I always have had to take care of myself. . 
But now I'm too old. 
And the testimony of Dr. Verne Peterson, eminently qualified, 
that Mrs. Norling had suffered brain damage and was incompetent to 
properly manage her property and was likely to be imposed upon by 
artful and designing persons, stands uncontradicted. 
THE COURT'S DECISION 
The court does not rule on this contention. Not a word. 
The court's decision in these cases is a grave miscarriage 
of justice. 
It is respectfully submitted that petition for rehearing should 
be granted. 
Date: June Jj 1975. 
r y/Mfa*, 
7ILLIAM fl. HENDE 
Attorney for Appellants. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Copy of the foregoing mailed to J. Richard Bell, Esq., 
(jfc 
attorney for respondent, at his office this / day of June, 1975, 
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